Abstract: Using a sample of 75 countries from U.S. Treasury regulatory data, we show that foreign investors invest less (more) in U.S. stocks (U.S. Treasuries) when they are from countries with greater linguistic distances and when U.S. financial reports are more difficult to read. This suggests that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability act as significant investment frictions, even in U.S. the market where foreign investors should have the greatest ability, resources, and economic incentives to overcome language translation and readability issues. Our results are consistent with a "substitution effect" where foreign investors who want to invest in U.S. stocks, but are sufficiently deterred by linguistic distance and financial reporting readability frictions, appear to seek the relative simplicity of investing in U.S. Treasuries.
I.

Introduction
Foreign investment is an essential component of the depth and liquidity of the United States (U.S.) security markets (Stulz 1999a; Stulz 1999b) . Approximately one-third of U.S. corporate stocks are owned by foreign investors, and foreign investment can facilitate growth and lower the cost of equity for U.S. firms (Bump 2017; Rosenthal 2017; Henry 2000a; Henry 2000b; Lizardo and Mollick 2009) . However, investors often face economic frictions (e.g. capital controls) and other impediments (e.g. a "home bias") when considering investing abroad (Kang and Stulz 1997; Karolyi and Stulz 2003; Chan et al. 2005; Lundholm et al. 2014) . We examine whether linguistic distance and the readability of U.S. financial reports are additional market frictions which affect foreign investment in U.S. stocks.
Linguistic distance reflects how different one language is from another (Isphording and Otten 2013) . We use a measure of linguistic distance between English and 43 other languages based on how difficult it was for a sample of English-speaking U.S. State Department employees to learn those languages (Chiswick and Miller 2005; Hart-Gonzalez and Lindemann 1993) .
Financial reporting readability refers to the ease with which a reader can process written text (Bonsall et al. 2017) . We create an aggregate measure of U.S. financial reporting readability based on the firm filing-level "Bog Index" created by Bonsall et al. (2017) which captures plain English attributes of disclosure (e.g. avoiding passive voice, weak verbs, overused words, complex words, and jargon). Linguistic distance and financial reporting readability are related constructs in our international setting because both may increase foreign investors' information processing costs, and in turn, reduce the amount of U.S. stocks they are willing to hold.
We demonstrate that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability are both negatively associated with foreign holdings of U.S. stocks. That is, foreign investors invest less in U.S. stocks when they are from countries with greater linguistic distances and when U.S.
financial reports are more difficult to read. Furthermore, we show that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability interact. Specifically, our results show that foreign investors from high linguistic distance countries facing unreadable financial reports reduce their investments less than foreign investors from low language distance countries facing the same unreadable financial reports. This suggests that foreign investors are sensitive to linguistic distance and financial reporting readability but are reluctant to reduce their investments in U.S. stocks below a certain floor (perhaps because their next best option involves either investing in their home country which reduces global diversification or investing in another country where they will still likely face a linguistic distance and financial reports that are difficult to read).
We find that these results are robust to (1) the inclusion of controls for a country's demographic, macroeconomic, tax, financial, legal, and cultural environment, (2) the use of an alternative linguistic distance measure, (3) excluding English speaking countries, (4) the use of monthly or annual foreign holdings data, (5) excluding offshore banking center countries, and (6) separate analyses of the world's largest and most influential economies (i.e. G-20 countries) and less developed economies. Additionally, we document that the results are robust to changes specifications designed to reduce the potential for non-stationarity or unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. These robustness tests demonstrate consistency and support for a negative association between both linguistic distance and financial reporting readability and foreign holdings of U.S. stocks.
If foreign investors are investing less in U.S. stocks in response to linguistic distance and difficulty reading financial reports, then foreign investors could be using that capital in numerous other ways. For example, foreign investors could choose to consume (rather than invest), invest in their home country, or invest in other foreign countries. We explore U.S. Treasuries as one possible alternative investment vehicle for foreign investors who are investing less in U.S. stocks in response to linguistic distance and difficulty reading financial reports. We find that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability are positively associated with foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries, and the interaction of linguistic distance and financial reporting readability is negatively associated with foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries. These mirror images of the U.S. stock results are consistent with a "substitution effect." In other words, foreign investors who want to invest in the U.S., but are sufficiently deterred by the linguistic distance and financial reporting readability frictions associated with stock ownership, appear to seek the relative simplicity of investing in U.S. Treasuries.
Our study contributes to multiple literatures including the international literature which examines frictions in cross-border financial market transactions. We contribute to this literature by using a large sample of 75 countries to show that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability influence foreign holdings of U.S. stocks. Demonstrating that linguistic distance and financial reporting affects foreign investment in the U.S. is important because the U.S. is the largest and most competitive capital market in the world with a strong information environment and no capital controls (Bradshaw et al. 2004; Ahearne et al. 2004; Stulz and Wasserfallen 1995) . Moreover, English is the dominant lingua franca ("language of business") around the world (Fredriksson et al. 2006; Neely 2012) . Thus, our results suggest that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability persist as significant frictions, even in the market where foreign investors should have the greatest ability, resources, and economic incentives to overcome language translation and readability issues. Moreover, we are the first to examine the impact of linguistic distance and financial reporting readability on foreign ownership of U.S. Treasuries.
Our results suggest that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability increase the demand for U.S. Treasuries (a unique result given that frictions generally reduce demand).
Second, we contribute to the recent literature on financial reporting readability. Prior research shows that firms opportunistically alter the readability of their financial reports (Li 2008) , and these actions adversely impact investors (You and Zhang 2009; Miller 2010; Rennekamp 2012; Lawrence 2013) , analysts (Lehavy et al. 2011; Bozanic and Thevenot 2015) , and credit rating agencies (Bonsall and Miller 2016) . Our results suggest that financial reporting readability acts as an international friction which affects the investment behavior of foreign investors-a large but previously overlooked population in this literature. Additionally, our results suggest that financial reporting readability can influence the demand for assets other than corporate stocks, including U.S. Treasuries that do not have associated financial statements.
Finally, our results may be of interest to regulators. Policy makers can do little to change linguistic distances, but securities regulators may be able to influence the readability of U.S. financial reports. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has long been concerned that firms fail to make their filings readable and understandable (Firtel 1999) . The SEC issued plain English disclosure guidelines in 1998 (SEC 1998) , and the SEC has considered using a readability measure to assess firm compliance (Loughran and McDonald 2014) . Our results suggest that a lack of financial reporting readability imposes a unique information externality on foreign investors and that the consequences differ depending on linguistic distance (i.e. foreign investors are not homogenous with respect to translation costs). Therefore, regulators may wish to more explicitly consider the ramifications of financial reporting readability for this economically important community, particularly given trends towards less readable financial reports and more foreign ownership of U.S. stocks.
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This study is organized as follows. Section II discusses prior research and motivates our hypotheses. Section III describes our data sources and sample. Section IV describes our methodology. Section V presents the results, and Section VI concludes.
II. Background and Hypothesis Development
Linguistic Distance A large literature explores how language and other cultural differences act as market frictions. For example, within the accounting literature, Lundholm et al. (2014) show that foreign firms with listings on U.S. stock exchanges generally write more readable financial reports than their U.S. counterparts to lessen the psychological distance between the firm and prospective U.S. investors. Within the finance literature, a large body of evidence concludes that investors have a propensity to avoid foreign stocks. That is, investors display a "home bias" where they overweight domestic stocks, potentially due to informational deficiencies and psychological biases induced by differences in language and culture (see Karolyi and Stulz 2003 for a review).
Relatedly, Baik et al. (2013) show that increases in foreign institutional ownership in U.S. stocks are negatively correlated with future returns, consistent with foreign investors facing a "liability of foreignness" that impairs their ability to predict returns. In economics, anecdotal evidence and academic research suggests that language barriers can impact bilateral trade volumes, the literacy and assimilation of immigrants, and a country's ability to attract high-skilled workers (Isphording and Otten 2013; Isphording 2014; Khazan 2013) .
We contribute to this literature by examining the association between linguistic distance and foreign investors' demand for U.S. stocks and U.S. Treasuries. At the construct level, linguistics researchers generally agree that linguistic distance represents how different one language is from another. However, languages are complex (e.g. they differ with respect to vocabulary, grammar, syntax, written form), and linguistics researchers do not agree on the best way to measure linguistic distance (Chiswick and Miller 2005; Isphording and Otten 2013) .
There are at least three methods to measure linguistic distance. First, some studies adopt an anthropologic approach and count the number of branches on language trees that two languages share (see Guiso et al. 2009 for an example). The underlying theory is that all languages descend from one (or a very small number) of languages, and language diversity is the result of Homo sapien migration "out of Africa" over the last 50,000 to 100,000 years.
According to this view, languages can be represented in the form of a tree (like genealogical trees). Languages that share more (fewer) branches are assumed to have a lower (greater) linguistic distance (Ginsburgh and Weber 2016).
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Second, other studies use a phonetic approach to measure linguistic distance (e.g. Isphording 2014; Isphording and Otten 2013) . The idea is to identify words having the same meaning in two different languages. The authors then use linguistics software to measure how much the pronunciations differ between the pair. Languages with a greater (lower) average pronunciation similarity across a set of words are assumed to have more (fewer) "cognates"
(common ancestries of words) and a lower (greater) linguistic distance.
Finally, Chiswick and Miller (2005) use a language acquisition approach. The idea is to measure how difficult it is to learn to speak another language. Conveniently, the U.S. Hart-Gonzalez and Lindemann (1993) and first used as a measure of linguistic distance in the academic literature by Chiswick and Miller (2005) .
We use the Chiswick and Miller (2005) measure of linguistic distance as our primary measure for three reasons. First, the language acquisition approach is simple and atheoretic. The approach does not rely on assumptions about the functional form of language trees, the validity of theories about prehistoric migration patterns, or the appropriate way to measure differences in pronunciation. Second, the Chiswick and Miller (2005) measure is the most task-relevant to our setting (i.e. it is the only proxy created by measuring how difficult it was for humans to process and respond to communication in another language). Finally, the Chiswick and Miller (2005) measure is publicly available for many languages. We expect linguistic distance to increase foreign investors' information processing costs, and in turn, reduce the amount of U.S. stocks they are willing to hold. However, there are 3 One criticism of the Chiswick and Miller (2005) measure is the lack of symmetry (i.e. the difficulty for a native English speaker to learn Spanish may not necessarily be the same as the difficulty for a native Spanish speaker to learn English). Hence, we use an alternate symmetric measure of linguistic distance using the phonetic approach as a robustness check (see Section V). Another concern about the Chiswick and Miller (2005) measure is that linguistic distances only exist relative to English (Isphording 2014) , but this restriction does not apply in our study because we only require a proxy for the distance between English and other languages.
multiple reasons why we may fail to find evidence supporting this prediction. First, the U.S. is the largest and most competitive capital market in the world with a strong information environment and no capital controls (Bradshaw et al. 2004; Ahearne et al. 2004; Stulz and Wasserfallen 1995) . Second, English is the dominant language of business around the world (Fredriksson et al. 2006; Neely 2012) . Third, tens of millions of foreign citizens have studied at universities where instruction is delivered in English, including many who study business and go on to be investors (Tietze 2004) . Overall, foreign investors investing in the U.S. are likely to be relatively sophisticated and may have sufficient abilities, resources, and economic incentives to overcome translation issues. Therefore, we state our first hypothesis in null form:
H1: Linguistic distance has no impact on foreign holdings of U.S. stocks.
Financial Reporting Readability
Firm financial reports are an important element of the U.S. information environment (Kothari 2001) , and investors, whether foreign or domestic, attempting to process the information within financial statements face a non-trivial task. Attempts to quantify the difficulty of processing written English text date back to the Fog Index created by Gunning (1952) .
However, the use of readability measures on firm disclosures in accounting and finance research was limited until relatively recently. Li (2008) shows that longer and less readable 10-K filings (as measured by the Fog Index) are associated with lower profitability and earnings persistence.
This result is consistent with managers manipulating the readability of financial reports to obfuscate poor performance. Subsequent research shows that such opportunistic behavior can affect the decision usefulness of financial statements for investors (You and Zhang 2009; Miller 2010; Rennekamp 2012; Lawrence 2013) , analysts (Lehavy et al. 2011; Bozanic and Thevenot 2015) , and credit rating agencies (Bonsall and Miller 2016) .
The empirical proxies for financial reporting readability have evolved as the literature has matured. Most early studies use the Gunning (1952) Fog Index which measures average sentence length and the percentage of complex words (i.e. words with more than three syllables).
However, Loughran and McDonald (2014) note that financial reports contain a large percentage of words with more than three syllables but that are not difficult to understand for most financial statement users (e.g. depreciation, liability). As such, Loughran and McDonald (2014) propose using the file size of the firm's electronic Form 10-K filing as an alternative readability measure.
Most recently, Bonsall et al. (2017) use computational linguistics software to create a "Bog Index" designed to capture plain English attributes of disclosure (e.g. avoiding passive voice, weak verbs, overused words, complex words, and jargon).
We use the Bonsall et al. (2017) Bog Index as the starting point for our measure of aggregate U.S. financial reporting readability for several reasons. First, the Bog Index uses a proprietary dictionary which avoids overstating word difficulty based on syllable counts. Second, the Bog Index captures more dimensions of readability beyond file size-based measures which only capture overwriting (Bonsall et al. 2017) . 4 Moreover, the Bog Index is the most taskrelevant to our setting. Specifically, the Bog Index captures the most dimensions of the SEC's plain English guidelines, and Bonsall et al. (2017) use an experiment and validate that human subjects find high Bog score documents harder to read (controlling for word count, file size, formatting, and Fog score). Finally, Bog scores for a large sample of 10-K filings over multiple years are publicly available.
We expect financial reporting readability to increase foreign investors' information processing costs, and in turn, reduce the amount of U.S. stocks they are willing to hold.
However, there are multiple reasons why we may fail to find evidence supporting this prediction.
First, Guay et al. (2016) On the other hand, if a foreign investor with a high linguistic distance facing unreadable U.S. financial reports invests less in U.S. stocks, then the question becomes where does she direct those funds? Investing those funds in her home country will reduce her global diversification and prevent her from enjoying the levels of investor protection, financial reporting quality, and financial market development available in the U.S. Alternatively, she's unlikely to escape language translation and financial reporting readability issues if she invests in another foreign country. For example, a South Korean investor will also face a high language distance if she decides to invest those funds in French stocks, and French financial reports may be difficult to read as well. Consequently, U.S. stocks may still be her first best option for at least a minimum portion of her portfolio. More formally, a foreign investor from a high linguistic distance country facing unreadable financial reports may reduce her investments less than a foreign investor from a low language distance country facing the same unreadable financial reports (e.g. the interaction could attenuate any main effect of financial reporting readability).
Ultimately, the impact of the interaction between linguistic distance and financial reporting readability is an empirical question, and we state our final hypothesis in null form:
The interaction of linguistic distance and financial reporting readability has no impact on foreign holdings of U.S. stocks.
III. Data and Sample
Foreign Ownership of U.S. Stocks TIC data on foreign holdings of U.S. stocks are at a monthly frequency, and thus we require a monthly aggregate measure of U.S. financial reporting readability. We begin with the Bog scores for firm-level Form 10-K filings created by Bonsall et al. (2017) . 9 We create a proxy for aggregate U.S. financial reporting readability by creating an equal weighted average of the Bog scores for all firms filing a 10-K over the past 12 months from month j-12 to month j-1.
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Finally, we subtract the sample mean of the time series from each month's value. 11 The resulting aggregate measure of financial reporting readability for month j-1 (BOGj-1) varies from -1.01 to 2.24 with higher values denoting less readability.
Sample
The TIC data described above provides monthly aggregate holdings of U.S. stocks by country for 125 countries. Requiring control variable data (discussed in the next section) reduces our sample to 75 countries. Our sample of 75 countries is quite large compared to other studies in the international literature. For example, Lundholm et al. (2014) examine the disclosure behavior of firms from 45 countries who list on a U.S. stock exchange. Moreover, the countries in our sample exhibit significant cross-sectional variation in size and economic importance. stocks over the sample period are Luxembourg ($438 billion), Japan ($348 billion), and Switzerland ($300 billion). The presence of Luxembourg and Switzerland amongst the largest holders is somewhat surprising given their small populations, but both countries are large financial centers and have some of the highest gross domestic product per capita in the world.
Similarly, the absence of China from the top five holders is somewhat surprising. However, China has the largest average holdings of U.S. Treasuries over the sample period ($1.15 Trillion)
suggesting that Chinese investors have a relative preference for U.S. debt securities over U.S. 13 The Korean writing system, Hangul, is an "alphabetic syllabary" which employs an alphabet, a syllabary, and a logography. Korean text often uses Hangul mixed with Chinese characters in a manner which aids or hinders reading depending on the familiarity of the reader with Chinese logographs (Taylor 1980 ). 14 Other systems exist including pictographic systems (e.g. ancient Aztec) and syllabaries (e.g. Cherokee). While Korean has syllabic elements, we do not have any "pure" pictographic or syllabic languages in our sample. However, some such languages have historical significance. For example, U.S. armed forces used "Code Talkers" to transmit coded messages based on Native American languages (e.g. Navajo and Choctaw) during World War II. Native American languages were useful because non-native speakers found them difficult to understand, few people outside of the associated tribes knew the languages, and virtually no books had been published in those languages. The Japanese never cracked these codes (Arbuckle 2017) , a testament to the power of linguistic distance.
equities. We examine the impact of financial centers and the effect of linguistic distance and financial reporting readability on U.S. Treasury holdings later in the paper. 
IV. Methodology
We empirically test H1, H2, and H3 simultaneously using the following linear regression where the unit of observation is country-month:
Variables not discussed in Section III are defined below. All variables are also defined in the Appendix. The Δ operator denotes the percentage change from year t-2 to year t-1. The β1 coefficient on LD, the β2 coefficient on BOG, and the β3 coefficient on LD*BOG test the null for H1, H2, and H3, respectively. We also estimate a reduced form of model (1) is a former British colony or is listed as a common law country in Table 2 of LaPorta et al.
(1998), and COMMONi equals zero otherwise. We expect the β17 coefficient to be positive, consistent with individuals preferring to invest in common law countries (Khurana and Michas 2011; Bae et al. 2008a; Bae et al. 2008b) . PROTECTi is a measure of the strength of investor protections in country i from the World Economic Forum. PROTECTi values are integers ranging from 1 to 7 where higher (lower) values denote stronger (weaker) investor protections.
19 Recent data leaks (e.g. "Wikileaks", the "Panama Papers", and the "Paradise Papers") reveal that wealthy individuals often use financial institutions in certain countries as intermediaries to evade taxes and maintain privacy, and such behavior can affect basic economic statistics (Haldevang 2017; Enrich 2018; Pacaud 2017 We expect the β18 coefficient to be negative, consistent with prior research which shows that investors in countries with stronger investor protections have less incentive to invest abroad (Aggarwal et al. 2005; Khurana and Michas 2011; Baik et al. 2013 ).
The final set of control variables (DIST and CULTURE) are time-invariant measures of the cultural environment in an investor's home country. DISTi is the distance between the capital of country i and New York City in kilometers. 21 The geographic distance between two countries can be an element of the "psychic distance" between the two cultures (Lopez-Duarte and VidalSuarez 2010; Lundholm et al. 2014) . Prior research shows that greater distances are negatively correlated with the bilateral trade of physical goods with direct transportation costs (Anderson 2011 ) and investment in financial securities (Portes et al. 2001; Portes and Rey 2005; Ferreira and Matos 2008; Baik et al. 2013 ). As such, we expect the β19 coefficient on DIST to be negative.
CULTUREi is the sum of six sub-measures of culture for country i based on Hofstede (2001) .
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We make no predictions on the sign of the β20 coefficient because it is not clear how the cultural sub-categories will combine to influence foreign investment in U.S. stocks. Overall, our descriptive statistics appear reasonable and consistent with prior studies. However, this positive correlation is likely the result of both variables trending upward (see Figure 1 ). We control for time trends in the regressions by including year fixed effects. Table 4 presents the results from regression model (1). We estimate regression model (1) with year fixed effects and cluster the standard errors by country. The first column of Table 4 presents the results of regression model (1) estimated without the interaction of LD and BOG.
V. Results
The advantage of omitting the interaction term is the interpretation of the main effect coefficients. However, the disadvantage of omitting the interaction is that if the interaction term is significant in the "true" model, then omitting the interaction term can introduce omitted correlated variable bias (Greene 2017) . With respect to the variables of interest, the β1 coefficient on LD is negative and significant at the 10% level. This result suggests rejection of the null hypothesis for H1 in favor of the alternative that investors from countries with greater linguistic distances hold less U.S. stocks. Interpreting the magnitude of the LD coefficient is complicated because linguistic distance is fixed for a country over time. Nevertheless, our results suggest that a one-unit change in LD (which would be equivalent to Italians suddenly speaking Arabic) is associated with a reduction in U.S. stock holdings by an economically significant $638 million.
Next, the β2 coefficient on BOG is not statistically significant which indicates failure to reject the null hypothesis for H2 in the reduced model. Finally, the β3 coefficient on the interaction of LD and BOG of 5,237.35 is significantly positive. The significant coefficient on the interaction term helps explain the lack of significance of the β2 coefficient on BOG in the reduced model. More specifically, the β2 and β3 coefficients have opposing signs in the full model, but Table 3 shows that BOG and LD*BOG are positively correlated (r=0.92, p<0.01). Thus, excluding the interaction term introduces omitted correlated variable bias. Notably, the β3 coefficient on the interaction term is less in absolute magnitude than the coefficient on BOG which suggests the interaction attenuates but does not fully eliminate the impact of financial reporting readability. More formally, the significantly negative β3 coefficient suggests rejection of the null hypothesis for H3 in favor of the alternative that foreign investors from high linguistic distance countries facing unreadable financial reports reduce their investments less than foreign investors from low language distance countries facing the same unreadable financial reports. Overall, foreign investors appear to be sensitive to linguistic distance and financial reporting readability but seem reluctant to reduce their investments in U.S. stocks below a certain floor (perhaps because their next best option involves either investing in their home country which reduces global diversification or investing in another country where they may continue to face a linguistic distance and financial reports that are difficult to read).
The second column of
The second column of Table 4 also shows that all control variables in the full model are significant at the 5% level except PROTECT. Moreover, the sign of the coefficients on each control variable for which we offer a directional prediction is consistent with our predictions.
With respect to the control variables where we did not make a prediction, our results suggest that investors from more populous countries (larger and faster growing economies) invest less (more) in U.S. stocks. Foreign investors tend to invest more in U.S. stocks when recent U.S. Treasury bond returns are more positive, and the significantly negative coefficient on CULTURE is consistent with culture acting as an important determinant of foreign investment behavior. We do not tabulate the fixed effect coefficients, but none of the year coefficients are statistically significant. This suggests that there are no time trends in foreign holdings of U.S. stocks after controlling for demographic, macroeconomic, financial, legal, and cultural environments, as well as the lag of U.S. investment. Finally, the adjusted R 2 of 0.980 suggests our model explains nearly all variation in foreign holdings of U.S. stocks.
The results in Table 4 are consistent with linguistic distance and financial reporting readability reducing foreign investors' willingness to hold U.S. stocks. Table 5 replicates regression model (1) utilizing an alternative linguistic distance from Isphording (2014) . As discussed in Section II, the Isphording (2014) measure has the advantage of being symmetric (although the phonetic approach relies on a computer algorithm to measure pronunciation similarity). The coefficients on LD and BOG remain negative and significant while the interaction term remains positive and significant. Additionally, the control variables all behave similarly to the main results in Table 4 .
Overall, inferences are similar regardless of which linguistic distance measure is used.
Next, Demirbag et al. (2007) observe that most studies examining the consequences of language use a simple dummy variable for a common language which implicitly treats all foreign languages the same (e.g. Lundholm et al. 2014; Baik et al. 2013) . We exclude the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica where LD = 0, thereby creating a sample where a common language dummy variable would equal zero. We also subtract 0.33 (Canada's LD value) from each remaining country's LD value so that LD can equal zero (i.e. Canada becomes the reference country) and we can interpret the main effect in the presence of the interaction term. Panel B of Table 5 shows that the coefficients on LD and BOG remain negative and significant while the interaction term remains positive and significant. This suggests that linguistic distance and financial readability matters even amongst countries with strictly positive linguistic distances. More importantly, these results suggest that other studies should consider using measures of linguistic distance rather than simple dummy variables to allow the economic consequences of language barriers to differ across languages.
Our final tabulated robustness check uses only annual data. As described above, the TIC holdings data are monthly while many of the control variables (e.g. macroeconomic data from the World Bank) are annual. In order to eliminate this inconsistency, we use only TIC holdings data at the end of January of each year. Using January data minimizes the time between the TIC holdings data and the associated control variables and yields a maximum of four observations per country (e.g. one observation per country for [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] . However, regression model (1) contains an intercept, four variables that are the same for every country for a given month (BOG, EQUITY, TREAS, and OIL), and is estimated using year fixed effects. Thus, when using annual data, we must suppress the intercept and eliminate the year fixed effects (and instead cluster both by country and year) or else there would be insufficient degrees of freedom to estimate the model. Panel C of Table 5 shows that the coefficients on LD and BOG remain negative and significant while the interaction term remains positive and significant. Thus, our full sample results are robust to the use of annual data.
We also perform a variety of untabulated robustness checks. First, we re-estimate regression model (1) Finally, we estimate regression model (1) augmented with additional control variables.
Specifically, we add (1) a measure of country i's English fluency, (2) a measure of the quality of country i's education system, (3) a measure of country i's income inequality, (4) the average value of institutional holdings in country i's domestic stock market over the sample period, (5) the variance in exchange rates between country i's local currency and U.S. dollars over the twelve months ending in month t-1, and (6) and the ratio of the market capitalization of the home country's stock market to home country GDP. 23 We do not include these variables in our primary regression specification in Table 4 because inclusion of these variables reduces our sample size by 61% (including the exclusion of economically important countries such as China) and introduces multicollinearity (e.g. education quality is highly correlated with GDP per capita, financial market development is highly correlated with financial reporting and auditing standards, etc.). Nevertheless, the coefficients on LD and BOG remain negative and significant while the interaction coefficient remains positive and significant.
One econometric concern with the levels specifications presented so far is that regression model (1) is an autoregressive model. The coefficient on the lagged holdings variable is statistically significant in Table 4 , which suggests that including the lag term is necessary to prevent autocorrelation in the residuals. However, the coefficient on the lagged holdings variable is statistically indistinguishable from one which raises concerns about a unit root (i.e. nonstationarity) and potentially inflates the model's R 2 . Another concern with regression model (1) is the potential for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. One solution for both concerns is the use of changes specifications. 24 We estimate two separate changes analyses. First, we subtract the lagged holdings variable from both sides of model, and the dependent variable becomes (CSi, . The resulting model is a "pseudo changes" model in that the dependent 23 Education quality data are available from the World Economic Forum. Income inequality data are from the CIA Factbook. Institutional holdings (a proxy for investor sophistication) are available from The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-institutionalinvestors-statistics-2017_instinv-2017-en. Market capitalization data are from the World Bank. Exchange rate data are from Oanda at https://www.oanda.com/currency/average. Finally, English fluency data are from Education First at https://www.ef.edu/epi/. The percentage of the population speaking English is explicitly considered when calculating LD. However, English fluency may still capture differences in information processing costs across countries (e.g. the difference in processing communication for investors from Canada speaking English versus investors from India speaking English). 24 Another common approach for the potential presence of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity is a fixed effects model. Unfortunately, estimating a model with country fixed effects is problematic in our setting because one of the primary variables of interest (LD) and multiple control variables are all time-invariant for a given country. Additionally, introducing fixed effects into an autoregressive model results in biased parameters (Nickell 1981). variable is an unscaled changes variable, but the remaining independent variables are unaltered (generally as levels variables). In a second changes specification, we scale the change variable by GDP to reduce heteroskedasticity and mitigate the impact of outliers (e.g. avoid small denominator problems). The dependent variable is (CSi,j -CSi,j-12)/GDPi,t-1, and we also transform the independent variables to changes variables where possible. Specifically, ΔBOG, ΔOIL, ΔPOP, and ΔBILAT represent percentage changes from twelve months prior. EQUITY, TREAS, and ΔGDPPC are already changes variables, and the other independent variables remain as levels variables because they are time-invariant. Table 6 presents the results of the changes analyses. The first column of Table 6 presents the results of the pseudo changes model. The coefficients on LD and BOG remain negative and significant while the interaction coefficient remains positive and significant. Moreover, the magnitude of these coefficients closely approximates those in Table 4 , and the behavior of all control variables also matches those in the primary analysis. Finally, the adjusted R 2 drops to 0.282, consistent with moving from a levels model to a changes model. The second column of Table 6 presents the specification using the scaled changes variable. The negative coefficient on LD suggests that a one-unit change in linguistic distance reduces a country's holdings of U.S.
stocks by an economically meaningful 0.63% of the country's GDP (when ΔBOG equals zero).
Similarly, the negative coefficient on ΔBOG suggests that a one-unit increase in BOG reduces a country's holdings of U.S. stocks by 2.11% of GDP (for countries where LD=0). The coefficient on the interaction term of 0.97% is significant but smaller in magnitude than the coefficient on BOG, suggesting that the interaction attenuates but does not fully eliminate the impact of a change in financial reporting readability on linguistically distant countries. While neither specification in Table 6 is a "pure" changes analysis (e.g. because LD is time-invariant), the inferences from the changes analyses are consistent with those from the levels analysis.
The results in Tables 4 through 6 suggest that foreign investors reduce their holdings of U.S. stocks in response to linguistic distance and difficulty reading U.S. financial reports. A natural follow-up question is "Where do foreign investors then direct those funds?" Foreign investors' options include, but are not limited to, (1) consuming rather than investing, (2) reallocating their U.S. equity investments (e.g. divesting from U.S. firms with less readable financial reports and investing in U.S. firms with more readable financial reports), and (3) investing in other foreign countries. We cannot precisely identify foreign investors' second-best investment option or explore all these potential behaviors given our data (e.g. our dependent variable would be unaffected if foreign investors merely sell some U.S. stock and buy an equal dollar amount other U.S. stocks). However, we explore whether foreign investors direct their spare investment funds towards U.S. Treasuries as one additional possibility.
We re-estimate regression model (1) using country i's holdings of U.S. Treasuries in millions of real 2010 U.S. dollars at the end of month j from TIC Table 1D as the dependent variable (USi,j). Table 7 presents the results. 25 The coefficients on LD and BOG are positive and significant, and the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant. These results are the mirror image of the U.S. stock results in Table 4 and suggest a "substitution effect." In other words, foreign investors who want to invest in U.S. stocks, but are sufficiently deterred by linguistic distance and financial reporting readability frictions, appear to seek the relative simplicity of investing in U.S. Treasuries. These results are meaningful because they suggest that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability increase the demand for U.S. Treasuries (a unique result given that frictions generally reduce demand). Moreover, these results suggest that financial reporting readability can influence the demand for assets other than corporate stocks, including U.S. Treasuries that do not have accompanying financial statements.
Overall, our results suggest that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability are negatively (positively) associated with foreign holdings of U.S. stocks (U.S. Treasuries). We acknowledge the limitations of our aggregate data as a caveat to our results and inferences. For example, we cannot identify investor-level characteristics others than nationality (e.g. whether the investor is an individual, institutional investor, firm, or government or whether the investor is sophisticated or unsophisticated). Similarly, we are unable to identify holdings characteristics (e.g. whether foreign investors tend to own stocks with easy or difficult to read financial reports).
VI. Conclusion
We demonstrate that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability are both negatively associated with foreign holdings of U.S. stocks. Our results suggest that foreign investors are sensitive to linguistic distance and U.S. financial reporting readability but are reluctant to reduce their investments in U.S. stocks below a certain floor (perhaps because their next best option involves either investing in their home country which reduces global diversification or investing in another country where they will still likely face a linguistic distance and financial reports that are difficult to read). Additionally, we find that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability are positively associated with foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries. This suggests that foreign investors who want to invest in U.S. stocks, but are sufficiently deterred by linguistic distance and financial reporting readability frictions, appear to seek the relative simplicity of investing in U.S. Treasuries.
These results should be of interest to researchers and policy makers. First, our results suggest that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability persist as significant frictions, even in the U.S. market where foreign investors should have the greatest ability, resources, and economic incentives to overcome these issues. Second, our results suggest that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability increase the demand for U.S. Treasuries (a novel result considering that U.S. Treasuries do not have associated financial statements and that frictions generally reduce demand). Finally, our study has implications for future research. A growing literature examines relationships between firm-level financial reporting outputs and macroeconomic outcomes (see Konchitchki and Patatoukas 2014; Crawley 2015; Gallo et al. 2016; Nallareddy and Ogneva 2017; Shivakumar and Urcan 2017) . Relatedly, our results extend to the aggregate level and suggest that linguistic distance and financial reporting readability can alter the absolute and relative demand for U.S. stocks and U.S. Treasuries. As such, future research may investigate whether changes in U.S. Treasury rates (i.e., the cost of capital for the U.S. government) and the cost of capital of U.S. firms influence firms' investment opportunity sets and total macroeconomic output.
This figure plots the time series of two monthly data series. The sample period begins in December 2011 and ends in December 2016. The solid line denotes total foreign holdings of U.S. stocks from U.S. Treasury International Capital Table 1D in millions of real 2010 U.S. dollars. The dashed line denotes an aggregate measure of financial reporting readability based on Bonsall et al.'s (2017) plain English "Bog Index" for firm-level 10-K filings (higher values denote less readability). See Section III for further discussion. Table 3 This Table 6 Changes Analyses
This table reports the results from cross-sectional regressions of changes in total holdings of U.S. stocks by investors in country i in millions of real 2010 U.S. dollars from month j -12 to month j on a measure of country i 's linguistic distance, the level or percentage change in an aggregate measure of U.S. financial reporting readability from month j -12 to month j , and a vector of controls. See Sections III and IV for variable definitions. The sample period begins in December 2012 and ends in December 2016. t -statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 7 Linguistic Distance, Financial Reporting Readability, and Foreign Holdings of U.S.
This table reports the results from a cross-sectional regression of US i,j (total holdings of U.S. Treasuries by investors in country i at the end of month j in millions of real 2010 U.S. dollars) on a measure of country i 's linguistic distance, an aggregate measure of U.S. financial reporting readability at month j -1, and a vector of controls. See Sections III and IV for variable definitions. The sample period begins in December 2012 and ends in December 2016. t -statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
